Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) [1] is a very attractive key distribution method as it takes the advantage of being compatible with standard telecommunication technology, especially no request of single photon detector. Despite a lot of effort invested in the theoretical analysis of CV-QKD protocols, composable security has been established for only two CV-QKD protocols, which are one-way squeezed-state protocol and no-switching protocol. The composable security proof for one-way squeezed-state protocol was obtained from an entropic uncertainty principle [2] . While the composable security proof for no-switching protocol was obtained by a composable security proof valid against collective attacks [3] followed by an additional argument to obtain security against general attacks [4, 5] . Here we give the composable security analysis of a new proposed CV-QKD protocol, continuous variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI QKD), in which detection is conducted by an untrusted third party and naturally defend all detector side channels. Security analysis shows that the secret key rate of CV-MDI QKD protocol converges to the usual value computed from the Holevo bound in the limit of large blocks. As shown in Ref. [3] , combining our security analysis here with either the de Finetti theorem or the postselection technique then shows the security of the CV-MDI QKD protocol against general attacks.
